

**WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**BEFORE THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ON SEPTEMBER 27th, 2007**

**ACCESSION TO THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND
RATIFICATION OF THE 1994 AGREEMENT AMENDING PART XI OF THE
LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION**
[Senate Treaty Document 103-39]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“the Convention”) and the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (“the 1994 Agreement”).

At my confirmation hearing earlier this year, I reminded the Committee that the Senate confirmed me 20 years ago as Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. Shortly thereafter, under the first President Bush, we began to work on revising the deep seabed mining section of the Convention to address the flaws President Reagan had correctly identified, so that we could join the Convention. That effort succeeded, resulting in the 1994 Agreement overhauling the deep seabed mining regime, as I will explain in greater detail.

Since my first involvement with the Law of the Sea Convention, I have had the privilege to serve the United States in other assignments that have only strengthened my support for this treaty. As Ambassador to the United Nations, I learned that other countries look to the United States for leadership on oceans issues such as maritime

security – a role that is lessened without U.S. accession to the Convention. As Ambassador to Iraq, I saw first-hand the importance of navigational freedoms for deploying and sustaining our forces in combat zones, and how the Convention serves as a foundation for our partnerships in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Most recently, as Director of National Intelligence, I was reminded how the Convention strengthens our ability to carry out intelligence activities that other countries might seek to restrain.

Mr. Chairman, these experiences compel me to endorse – most enthusiastically and emphatically – the President’s urgent request that the Senate approve the Convention, as modified by the 1994 Agreement. As the President said in his May 15 statement, joining will serve the national security interests of the United States, secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive marine areas, promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans, and give the United States a seat at the table when the rights essential to our interests are debated and interpreted.

HISTORY

From the earliest days of its history, the United States has relied on the bounty and the opportunity of the seas for sustenance, for trade and economic development, for defense, for communication, and for interaction with the rest of the world. Today, as the world’s strongest maritime power and a leader in global maritime trade and commerce, the United States has a compelling national interest in a stable international legal regime for the oceans. We have consistently sought balance between the interests of countries in controlling activities off their coasts and the interests of all countries in protecting freedom of navigation. The United States joined a group of law of the sea treaties in 1958, by which it is still bound. But those treaties left open some important issues. For

example, they did not set forth the maximum breadth of the territorial sea, an issue of critical importance to U.S. freedom of navigation, and they did not set forth a procedure for providing legal certainty regarding the continental shelf. We therefore continued to pursue completion of a single, integrated law of the sea treaty that would attract near-universal acceptance; the U.S. delegation played a very prominent role in the negotiating session that began under the Nixon Administration and culminated in the 1982 Convention.

The resulting treaty was a victory for U.S. navigational, economic, and other interests except for one important issue -- deep seabed mining. Due to flaws in the deep seabed mining chapter -- Part XI of the Convention -- President Reagan decided not to sign the 1982 Convention. However, the other aspects of the treaty were so favorable that President Reagan, in his Ocean Policy Statement in 1983, announced that the United States accepted, and would act in accordance with, the Convention's balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans -- everything but deep seabed mining. He instructed the Government to abide by, or as the case may be, to enjoy the rights accorded by, the other provisions, and to encourage other countries to do likewise.

As I mentioned earlier, the first Bush Administration agreed to participate in negotiations that modified Part XI -- in a legally binding manner -- overcoming each of the objections that President Reagan had identified. The United States signed that Agreement in 1994. The Convention came into force that same year, and has since been joined by industrialized countries that shared the U.S. objections to the initial deep seabed mining chapter. There are now 155 parties to the Convention, including almost all of our traditional allies.

This Administration expressed its strong support for the Convention in testimony before this Committee in the fall of 2003. Thereafter we worked closely with the Committee to develop a proposed Resolution of Advice and Consent, which we continue to support, that addressed a number of issues, including those relating to U.S. military interests. Since then, our conviction has only grown: we must join the Law of the Sea Convention, and join it now, to take full advantage of the many benefits it offers the United States and to avoid the increasing costs of being a non-party.

JOINING IS A WIN-WIN.

Joining is a win/win proposition. We will not have to change U.S. laws or practices, or give up rights, and we will benefit in a variety of ways. The United States already acts in accordance with the Convention for a number of reasons:

- First, as noted, we are party to a group of 1958 treaties that contain many of the same provisions as the Convention.
- Second, the United States heavily influenced the content of the 1982 Convention, based on U.S. law, policy, and practice.
- Finally, the treaty has been the cornerstone of U.S. oceans policy since 1983, when President Reagan instructed the Executive Branch to act in accordance with the Convention's provisions with the exception of deep seabed mining.

Thus, we are in the advantageous position in the case of this treaty that U.S. adherence to its terms is already time-tested and works well.

At the same time, the United States would gain substantial benefits from joining the Convention – these can be summarized in terms of security, sovereignty, and sustainability.

Security. As the world's foremost maritime power, our security interests are intrinsically linked to freedom of navigation. We have more to gain from legal certainty and public order in the world's oceans than any other country. Our forces are deployed throughout the world, and we are engaged in combat operations in Central and Southwest Asia. The U.S. Armed Forces rely on the navigational rights and freedoms reflected in the Convention for worldwide access to get to the fight, sustain our forces during the fight, and return home safely, without permission from other countries.

In this regard, the Convention secures the rights we need for U.S. military ships and the commercial ships that support our forces to meet national security requirements in four ways:

- by limiting coastal States' territorial seas -- within which they exercise the most sovereignty -- to 12 nautical miles;
- by affording our military and commercial vessels and aircraft necessary passage rights through other countries' territorial seas and archipelagoes, as well as through straits used for international navigation (such as the critical right of submarines to transit submerged through such straits);
- by setting forth maximum navigational rights and freedoms for our vessels and aircraft in the exclusive economic zones of other countries and in the high seas; and
- by affirming the authority of U.S. warships and government ships to board stateless vessels on the high seas, which is a critically important element of maritime security operations, counter-narcotic operations, and anti-proliferation efforts, including the Proliferation Security Initiative.

The United States has had a certain amount of success in promoting these provisions internationally as reflective of customary international law, as well as in enforcing them through operational challenges. However, these tools alone are not adequate to ensure the continued vitality of these rights. Customary law is not universally accepted and, in any event, changes over time – in this case, potentially to the detriment of our interests. There are increasing pressures from coastal States around the world to evolve the law of the sea in ways that would unacceptably alter the balance of interests struck in the Convention. Operational challenges are inherently risky and resource-intensive. Joining the Convention would put the navigational rights reflected in the Convention on the firmest legal footing. We would have treaty rights rather than have to rely solely upon the acceptance of customary international law rights by other states or upon the threat or use of force. Securing these treaty rights, and obtaining a seat at the table in treaty-based institutions, would provide a safeguard against changes in State practice that could cause customary law to drift in an unfavorable direction. Moreover, joining would promote the willingness of other countries to cooperate with us on initiatives of great security importance, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Sovereignty. Joining the Convention would advance U.S. economic and resource interests. Recent Russian expeditions to the Arctic have focused attention on the resource-related benefits of being a party to the Convention. Because so much is at stake in vast areas of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, I will explain in some detail the Convention's provisions that govern these areas and why being a party would put the United States in a far better position in terms of maximizing its sovereign rights.

The Convention recognizes the sovereign rights of a coastal State over its continental shelf, which extends out to 200 nautical miles – and beyond, if it meets specific criteria. These rights include sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the continental shelf and exploiting its natural resources, including oil, gas, and other energy resources. U.S. interests are well served not only by the Convention’s detailed definition of the shelf (in contrast to the 1958 Convention’s vague standard), but also by its procedures for gaining certainty regarding the shelf’s outer limits. Parties enjoy access to the expert body whose technical recommendations provide the needed international recognition and legal certainty to the establishment of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.

Following such procedures, Russia made the first submission (in 2001) to that expert body, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The Commission found that Russia needed to collect additional data to substantiate its submission. Russia has announced that the data it collected this year support the claim that its continental shelf extends as far as the North Pole. Setting aside its recent flag planting, which has only symbolic value, Russia’s continuing data collection in the Arctic reflects its commitment to maximizing its sovereign rights under the Convention over energy resources in that region.

Currently, as a non-party, the United States is not in a position to maximize its sovereign rights in the Arctic or elsewhere. We do not have access to the Commission’s procedures for according international recognition and legal certainty to our extended shelf. And we have not been able to nominate an expert for election to the Commission.

Thus, there is no U.S. commissioner to review the detailed data submitted by other countries on their shelves.

Norway has also made a submission to support its extended continental shelf in the Arctic, and Canada and Denmark are conducting surveys there to collect data for their submissions. The Commission has already made recommendations on submissions by Brazil and Ireland and is considering several other submissions. Many more are expected in the coming months.

The United States has one of the largest continental shelves in the world; in the Arctic, for example, our shelf could run as far as 600 miles from the coastline. However, as noted, we have no access to the Commission, whose recommendations would facilitate the full exercise of our sovereign rights – whether we use them to explore and exploit natural resources, prevent other countries from doing so, or otherwise. In the absence of the international recognition and legal certainty that the Convention provides, U.S. companies are unlikely to secure the necessary financing and insurance to exploit energy resources on the extended shelf, and we will be less able to keep other countries from exploiting them.

Joining the Convention provides other economic benefits: it also gives coastal States the right to claim an exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) out to 200 nautical miles. That gives the United States, with its extensive coastline, the largest EEZ of any country in the world. In this vast area, we have sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing living and non-living natural resources.

Sustainability. The Convention also supports U.S. interests in the health of the world’s oceans and the living resources they contain. It addresses marine pollution from

a variety of sources, including ocean dumping and operational discharges from vessels. The framework appropriately balances the interests of the coastal State in protection of the marine environment and its natural resources with the navigational rights and freedoms of all States. This framework, among other things, supports vital economic activities off the coast of the United States. Further, the United States has stringent laws regulating protection of the marine environment, and we would be in a stronger position as a party to the Convention as we encourage other countries to follow suit.

The Convention also promotes the conservation of various marine resources. Indeed, U.S. ocean resource-related industries strongly support U.S. accession to the Convention. U.S. fishermen, for example, want their government to be in the strongest possible position to encourage other governments to hold their fishermen to the same standards we are already following, under the Convention and under the Fish Stocks Agreement that elaborates the Convention's provisions on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.

Joining the Convention provides other important benefits that straddle the security, sovereignty, and sustainability categories. For example, its provisions protect laying and maintaining the fiber optic cables through which the modern world communicates, for both military and commercial purposes; for that reason, the U.S. telecommunications industry is a strong supporter of the Convention.

WE NEED TO JOIN NOW

Some may ask why, after the Convention has been in force for thirteen years, there is an urgent need to join. There are compelling reasons why we need to accede to the Convention now.

Although the first several years of the Convention's life were fairly quiet, its provisions are now being actively applied, interpreted, and developed. The Convention's institutions are up and running, and we -- the country with the most to gain and lose on law of the sea issues -- are sitting on the sidelines. For example, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (which is the technical body charged with addressing the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles) has received nine submissions and has made recommendations on two of them, without the participation of a U.S. commissioner. Recommendations made in that body could well create precedents, positive and negative, on the future outer limit of the U.S. shelf. We need to be on the inside to protect our interests. Moreover, in fora outside the Convention, the provisions of the Convention are also being actively applied. Our position as a non-Party puts us in a far weaker position to advance U.S. interests than should be the case for our country.

We also need to join now to lock in, as a matter of treaty law, the very favorable provisions we achieved in negotiating the Convention. It would be risky to assume that we can preserve ad infinitum the situation upon which the United States currently relies. As noted, there is increasing pressure from coastal States to augment their authority in a manner that would alter the balance of interests struck in the Convention. We should secure these favorable treaty rights while we have the chance.

DEEP SEABED MINING

One part of the Convention deserves special attention, because, in its original version, it kept the United States and other industrialized countries from joining. Part XI of the Convention, now modified by the 1994 Implementing Agreement, establishes a system for facilitating potential mining activities on the seabed beyond the

limits of national jurisdiction – specifically, the deep seabed beyond the continental shelf of any nation. The Convention, as modified, meets our goal of guaranteed access by U.S. industry to deep seabed minerals under reasonable terms and conditions.

Specifically, the Convention sets forth the process by which mining firms can apply for and obtain access and exclusive legal rights to deep seabed mineral resources. The International Seabed Authority is responsible for overseeing such mining; it includes an Assembly, open to all Parties, and a 36-member Council. The Authority's role is limited to administering deep seabed mining of mineral resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction; it has no other authority over uses of the oceans or over other resources in the oceans. The Council is the primary decision-making body, with responsibility for giving practical effect to the requirement for non-discriminatory access to deep seabed minerals and for adopting rules for exploration and development.

The 1994 Agreement, which contains legally binding changes to the 1982 Convention, fundamentally overhauls the deep seabed mining provisions in a way that satisfies each of the objections of the United States, as stated by President Reagan, and of other industrialized countries. President Reagan considered that those provisions would deter future development of deep seabed mining; establish a decision-making process that would not give the United States a role that reflected or protected its interests; allow amendments to enter into force without the approval of the United States; provide for mandatory transfer of technology; allow national liberation movements to share in the benefits of deep seabed mining; and not assure access of future qualified miners.

The 1994 Agreement overcomes these objections and ensures that the administration of deep seabed mining is based on free-market principles. Specifically, the Agreement:

- deletes the objectionable provisions on mandatory technology transfer;
- ensures that market-oriented approaches are taken to the management of deep seabed minerals (e.g., by eliminating production controls), replacing the original Part XI's centralized economic planning approach;
- scales back the deep seabed mining institutions and links their activation and operation to actual development of interest in deep seabed mining;
- guarantees the United States a permanent seat on the Council, where substantive decisions are made by consensus – the effect of which is that any decision that would result in a substantive obligation on the United States, or that would have financial or budgetary implications, would require U.S. consent;
- ensures that the United States would need to approve the adoption of any amendment to the Part XI provisions and any distribution of deep seabed mining revenues accumulated under the Convention; and
- recognizes the seabed mine claims established on the basis of the exploration already conducted by U.S. companies and provides assured equality of access for any future qualified U.S. miners.

The deep seabed is an area that the United States has never claimed and has consistently recognized as being beyond the sovereignty and jurisdiction of any nation. As reflected in U.S. law (the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980), it has

long viewed deep seabed mining as an activity appropriate for international administration. The United States asked for changes to the 1982 Convention's deep seabed mining provisions and got them. As George P. Shultz, Secretary of State to President Reagan, said recently in a letter to Senator Lugar: "The treaty has been changed in such a way with respect to the deep sea-beds that it is now acceptable, in my judgment. Under these circumstances, and given the many desirable aspects of the treaty on other grounds, I believe it is time to proceed with ratification."

WHY STAY OUT?

Given all the valuable benefits of joining and the substantial costs of not joining, is there a persuasive argument why the United States should remain a non-party? I do not think there is one.

Certain arguments distort the risks of joining and/or paint an unrealistic picture of our situation as a non-party. In this regard, opponents do not offer viable alternatives to the Convention. Some say we should rely on the 1958 conventions; however, those are less favorable in many respects, such as navigational rights, the outer limits of the continental shelf, and authority to conduct boardings on the high seas. Some say we should continue to rely on customary law; however, as noted, customary law is not universally accepted, evolves based on State practice, and does not provide access to the Convention's procedural mechanisms, such as the continental shelf commission. Finally, some say we should rely on the threat or use of force; however, it is implausible and unwise to think that the United States can rely on military power alone to enforce its rights, particularly economic rights.

Certain arguments against U.S. accession are simply inaccurate. And other arguments are outdated, in the sense that they may have been true before the deep seabed mining provisions were fixed and thus are no longer true. I would like to address some of these “myths” surrounding the Convention:

Myth: Joining the Convention would surrender U.S. sovereignty.

Reality: On the contrary. Some have called the Convention a “U.S. land grab.” It expands U.S. sovereignty and sovereign rights over extensive maritime territory and natural resources off its coast, as described earlier in my testimony. It is rare that a treaty actually increases the area over which a country exercises sovereign rights, but this treaty does. The Convention does not harm U.S. sovereignty in any respect. As sought by the United States, the dispute resolution mechanisms provide appropriate flexibility in terms of both the forum and the exclusion of sensitive subject matter. The deep seabed mining provisions do not apply to any areas in which the United States has sovereignty or sovereign rights; further, these rules will facilitate mining activities by U.S. companies. And the navigational provisions affirm the freedoms that are important to the worldwide mobility of U.S. military and commercial vessels.

Myth: The Convention is a “UN” treaty and therefore does not serve our interests.

Reality: The Convention is not the United Nations – it was merely negotiated there, as are many agreements, and negotiated by States, not by UN bureaucrats. Further, just because a treaty was drawn up at the UN does not mean it does not serve our interests. For example, the United States benefits from UN treaties such as the Convention Against Corruption and the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. The Law of the Sea Convention is another such treaty that serves U.S. interests.

Myth: The International Seabed Authority (ISA) has the power to regulate seven-tenths of the Earth's surface.

Reality: The Convention addresses seven-tenths of the earth's surface; the ISA does not. First, the ISA does not address activities in the water column, such as navigation. Second, the ISA has nothing to do with the ocean floor that is subject to the sovereignty or sovereign rights of any country, including that of the United States. Third, the ISA only addresses deep seabed mining. Thus, its role is limited to mining activities in areas of the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction. It has no other role and no general authority over the uses of the oceans, including freedom of navigation and overflight.

Myth: The Convention gives the UN its first opportunity to levy taxes.

Reality: Although the Convention was negotiated under UN auspices, it is separate from the UN and its institutions are not UN bodies. Further, there are no taxes of any kind on individuals or corporations or others. Concerning oil/gas production within 200 nautical miles of shore, the United States gets exclusive sovereign rights to seabed resources within the largest such area in the world. There are no finance-related requirements in the EEZ. Concerning oil/gas production beyond 200 nautical miles of shore, the United States is one of a group of countries potentially entitled to extensive continental shelf beyond its EEZ. Countries that benefit from an Extended Continental Shelf have no requirements for the first five years of production at a site; in the sixth year of production, they are to make payments equal to 1% of production, increasing by 1% a year until capped at 7% in the twelfth year of production. If the United States were to pay royalties, it would be because U.S. oil and gas companies are engaged in successful production

beyond 200 nautical miles. But if the United States does not become a party, U.S. companies will likely not be willing or able to engage in oil/gas activities in such areas, as I explained earlier.

Concerning mineral activities in the deep seabed, which is beyond U.S. jurisdiction, an interested company would pay an application fee for the administrative expenses of processing the application. Any amount that did not get used for processing the application would be returned to the applicant. The Convention does not set forth any royalty requirements for production; the United States would need to agree to establish any such requirements.

In no event would any payments go to the UN, but rather would be distributed to countries in accordance with a formula to which the United States would have to agree.

Myth: The Convention would permit an international tribunal to second-guess the U.S. Navy.

Reality: No international tribunal would have jurisdiction over the U.S. Navy. U.S. military activities, including those of the U.S. Navy, would not be subject to any form of dispute resolution. The Convention expressly permits a party to exclude from dispute settlement those disputes that concern “military activities.” The United States will have the exclusive right to determine what constitutes a military activity.

Myth: The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea could order the release of a vessel apprehended by the U.S. military.

Reality: The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to order release in such a case. Its authority to address the prompt release of vessels applies only to two types of cases: fishing and

protection of the marine environment. Further, even if its mandate did extend further – which it does not – the United States will be taking advantage of the optional exclusion of military activities from dispute settlement. As such, in no event would the Tribunal have any authority to direct the release of a vessel apprehended by the U.S. military.

Myth: The Convention was drafted before – and without regard to – the war on terror and what the United States must do to wage it successfully.

Reality: The Convention enhances, rather than undermines, our ability to wage the war on terror. Maximum maritime naval and air mobility is essential for our military forces to operate effectively. The Convention provides the necessary stability and framework for our forces, weapons, and materiel to get to the fight without hindrance. It is essential that key sea and air lanes remain open as a matter of international legal right and not be contingent upon approval from nations along those routes. The senior U.S. military leadership – the Joint Chiefs of Staff – has recently confirmed the continuing importance of U.S. accession to the Convention in a letter to the Committee.

Myth: The Convention would prohibit or impair U.S. intelligence and submarine activities.

Reality: The Convention does not prohibit or impair intelligence or submarine activities. Joining the Convention would not affect the conduct of intelligence activities in any way. This issue was the subject of extensive hearings in 2004 before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Witnesses from Defense, CIA, and State all confirmed that U.S. intelligence and submarine activities are not adversely affected by the Convention.

We follow the navigational provisions of the Convention today and are not adversely affected; similarly, we would not be adversely affected by joining.

Myth: The United States can rely on use or threat of force to protect its navigational interests fully.

Reality: The United States has utilized diplomatic and operational challenges to resist the excessive maritime claims of other countries that interfere with U.S. navigational rights. But these operations entail a certain degree of risk, as well as resources. Being a party to the Convention would significantly enhance our efforts to roll back these claims by, among other things, putting the United States in a stronger position to assert our rights.

Myth: Joining the Convention would hurt U.S. maritime interdiction efforts under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Reality: Joining the Convention would not affect applicable maritime law or policy regarding the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction. PSI specifically requires participating countries to act consistent with international law, which includes the law reflected in the Convention. Almost all PSI partners are parties to the Convention. Further, joining the Convention is likely to strengthen PSI by attracting new cooperative partners.

Myth: President Reagan thought the treaty was irremediably defective.

Reality: As explained above, President Reagan identified only certain deep seabed mining provisions of the Convention as flawed. His 1983 Ocean Policy Statement demonstrates that he embraced the non-deep-seabed provisions and established them as

official U.S. policy. The 1994 Agreement overcomes each of the objections to the deep seabed mining provisions identified by President Reagan. As President Reagan's Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, noted in his recent letter to Senator Lugar, "It surprises me to learn that opponents of the treaty are invoking President Reagan's name, arguing that he would have opposed ratification despite having succeeded on the deep sea-bed issue. During his administration, with full clearance and support from President Reagan, we made it very clear that we would support ratification if our position on the sea-bed issue were accepted."

Myth: The Convention provides for mandatory technology transfer.

Reality: Mandatory technology transfer was eliminated by the 1994 Agreement that modified the original Convention.

Myth: The United States could and should renegotiate a new law of the sea agreement, confined to the provisions on navigational freedoms.

Reality: Assuming, for the sake of argument, that this were a desirable outcome, other countries would have no reason or incentive to enter into such a negotiation. The Convention is widely accepted, having been joined by over 150 parties including all other major maritime powers and most other industrialized nations. Those parties are generally satisfied with the entirety of the treaty and would be unwilling to sacrifice other provisions of the Convention, such as benefits associated with exclusive economic zones and sovereign rights over the resources they contain, as well as continental shelves out to 200 nautical miles and in some cases far beyond. And parties that would like to impose

new constraints on our navigational freedoms certainly would not accept the 1982 version of those freedoms.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I am confident that the Committee will agree that U.S. accession to the Convention is the best way to secure navigational and economic rights related to the law of the sea. I hope I have convinced the Committee that arguments against joining the Convention are completely unfounded, that there are not viable alternatives to joining, and that we cannot just go out and negotiate another treaty, much less one that is more favorable. And we certainly cannot have much influence over development of the law of the sea in the 21st Century from outside the Convention.

The safest, most secure, and most cost-effective way to lock in these significant benefits to our ocean-related interests is to join the Convention. President Bush, Secretary Rice, and I urge the Committee – once again – to give its swift approval for U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention and ratification of the 1994 Agreement, and we urge the Senate to give its advice and consent before the end of this session of Congress.